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The Aesthetics of Junkyards and Roadside Clutter
  Thomas Leddy 
Abstract
A little more than thirty years ago, Allen Carlson argued that
although the concept of "Camp" would seem to allow for the
aesthetic redemption of roadside clutter and junkyards, it does
not.[1] He opposes those who claim that if one takes the right
attitude to roadside clutter it can be seen as aesthetic. In this essay
I argue that that there is nothing wrong with this, although I will not
base my argument on the idea of Camp sensibility.
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1. The Aesthetics of Waste
Several years ago my sister, a painter, took me to a junkyard she
was quite excited about. "Bring your camera," she said. She had
been purchasing items there to add to her paintings as assemblage
elements. We went and had a great time. When I fi[rst started
writing this paper it struck me that I would be sad to hear that the
junkyard was gone. Recently my sister informed me that is in fact
gone, and I actually was saddened. Carlson argues that my
aesthetically positive response to this junkyard would be
inappropriate, and that it is almost inconceivable that I would be
saddened by its disappearance. He thinks that I could appreciate the
junkyard in what he calls a "thin" formalist sense, but not in a
"thick" knowledge-based sense, and that my advocating the
aesthetic value of junkyards is unethical since I am thereby
indirectly advocating many negative values, especially anti-
environmentalist ones. Yet I am quite sympathetic to
environmentalism and, although I am sad to see the junkyard gone,
I would probably be happy enough if, in the unlikely event, I found
later that it was replaced by a lovely meadow. But one person's
roadside trash is another's treasure, and I wouldn't be surprised if
Carlson would insist that my junkyard must go. Thus, I must deny
his premise that junkyards and roadside clutter generally are not
aesthetically pleasing, if by that he means (and I think he does) that
they are never appropriately aesthetically pleasing."
Denying this premise is tricky since the word 'clutter' has a negative
connotation. People who, like myself, sometimes favor clutter might
be better described as favoring what others consider clutter. Still,
part of the aesthetic fascination with clutter, for those who like it, is
that it is not neat. As I have argued elsewhere, messiness can
sometimes be a positive aesthetic quality.[2] In short, I think that
we should allow for the possibility of aesthetically appreciating
roadside clutter and junkyards, and even for the possibility of being
saddened if a favorite junkyard were to be removed.
It is not that I favor preserving of eyesores. But I do favor
appreciating and even sometimes preserving some things that
others consider eyesores. This parallels the fact that I find my own
working-class neighborhood endlessly fascinating visually, although
much of what I appreciate and photograph there would be
considered clutter by others. The middle-class neighborhood next
door is delightful to walk in; all of the front yards are very tasteful.
But they are, photographically, pretty uninteresting by comparison.
That is, there are many photography buffs like myself who take
more pleasure in cluttered or visually unusual front yards than in the
"tasteful" ones found in more middleclass environments.
How is it possible that clutter and junkyards can be legitimately
appreciated? Modern artist made it possible: the works of Pablo
Picasso, Robert Rauschenberg, Edward Kienholtz, Jim Dine, Claes
Oldenburg, Allan Kaprow, Bruce Conner, Joseph Cornell, Alberto
Burri, John Chamberlain, the Arte Povera artists, and many others. A
recent example would be Richard Misrach, who takes gorgeous
photos of waste sites in natural settings, for example, "Bomb,
Destroyed Vehicles and Lone Rock, Bravo 20 Bombing Range,
Nevada," 1987. In another recent example, contemporary painter
Altoon Sultan takes roadside objects in rural environments that
might often be seen as unsightly and transforms them into things of
beauty.
The aesthetics of junk has not been lost those who are in the
business of waste management and recycling. Norcal Waste System,
for example, has an artist-in-residence program in which artists are
encouraged to incorporate junk and waste into their creative
process.[3] Seventy-eight artists have participated since 1990. It is
doubtful that Camp sensibility played much of a role in this. Most of
this work, rather, is an extension of the concepts of collage and
assemblage developed in the early part of the 20th century. There
have been other motives as well for artistic interest in garbage.
Rauschenberg, for example, was interested in a critique of the
merely pretty and the decorative. [4] And some of the artists at the
Norcal site are interested in issues of recycling and
environmentalism.
Carlson is very aware of the influence of contemporary art on our
appreciation of junkyards, although he puts his point in terms of the
concept of Camp. As he says, "Camp has developed hand in hand
with certain avant garde art movements, some of which often
imitate such things as billboards and tin cans, and others of which
occasionally utilize junk and trash as a medium."[5] He thinks that
these art objects can sometimes escape his condemnation of junk
without in any way legitimating aesthetic appreciation of the
junkyard. But is this really possible?
In the article which originally inspired Carlson’s theory, Monroe
Beardsley refers to a cartoon in which a junkman proclaims that his
pile is not an eyesore because of its similarities to some works by
Picasso. Beardsley argues that this gives rise to what he calls "the
dilemma of aesthetic education."[6] The dilemma is between two
ways of directing taste: one that is reformist towards an ideal of
beauty, while the other aestheticizes everything, taking the aesthetic
point of view whenever possible. The first is more traditional. It is
associated with programs of beautification in which highways are
shielded from junkyards and billboards. But he observes that the
second might sometimes be appropriate when the intensity of the
regional qualities of the object "partly depends on its symbolic
import." In such circumstances an ordinary object can be
expressive. As he puts it "Suddenly, a whole new field of aesthetic
gratification opens up. Trivial objects, the accidental, the neglected,
the meretricious and vulgar, all take on new excitement. The
automobile graveyard and the weed-filled garden are seen to have
their own wild and grotesque expressiveness as well as symbolic
import."[7] He thinks that although at first we find litter, junkyards,
and so forth unsightly, but they may be perceptually transformed.
However, he sees the second way as "defeatist" as it does not aim
to eliminate the junkyard. Moreover, he observes, a "weighty
tradition" argues that sometimes there are moral objections to
taking an aesthetic point of view, as in aestheticization of Auschwitz.
Nonetheless, he thinks that "there is nothing…that is per se wrong
to consider from the aesthetic point of view."[8]
Just before bringing up the case of the junkyard owner, Beardsley
mentions the concept of Camp that was developed in the late 1960s
by Susan Sontag.[9] Sontag argued that Camp, a certain way of
seeing, can transform our experience of things we generally do not
find aesthetically pleasing, for example kitsch.[10]
This attitude, however, is hardly limited to Camp. It is equally true
for Dadaist, Surrealist, and Postmodern sensibilities. Moreover,
Camp is a specialized sensibility that is only indirectly related to
aesthetic appreciation of junkyards. (Beardsley seems to realize this,
but Carlson does not.) Sontag associates Camp with "artifice and
exaggeration." It is a sensibility that "converts the serious into the
frivolous." Basically it is an urban and gay thing. (Sontag calls it
"androgynous," and although she does not identify it with gay
culture, she observes an affinity. Also, when she refers to junk she
seems mainly to be thinking of things to be found in junk stores
rather than to junkyards or roadside clutter.) Camp is associated
with the glitzy and the glamorous. In the last line of her essay
Sontag that the ultimate Camp statement: "it's good because it's
awful." Yet this does not seem to apply to appreciation of junkyards
and roadside clutter. Rauschenberg's work, for example, seems
unrelated to Camp.[11] Nothing he says, for example, implies that
he thought garbage was good because it was awful!
2. Sensibility and Aesthetic Appreciation
The interest in junk as a medium for art was widespread in early
1960s. Arman (Armand Pierre Fernadez) a French artist, produced a
show in 1960 called "Plein" ("The Filled") in which he completely
filled a gallery with garbage. Even before that, in 1959, he produced
found-object sculptures called "Poubelles" ("Garbage Cans") which
were glass cases filled with cast-offs of friends.[12] Relocating to
New York City in 1961, he continued his interest in garbage, making
realistic bronzes of it in the 1970s. He saw himself as attacking the
culture of consumption and waste.[13]
Although Sontag is right that having a certain sensibility is
important, something more traditional and broader than Camp, like
disinterested perception, the aesthetic attitude, or Beardsley's own
"aesthetic point of view" would probably be sufficient for
appreciating junk. Carlson recognizes this, but avoids discussing the
point as he thinks that the concept of the aesthetic attitude, and
presumably the "aesthetic point of view," are questionable.[14]
However, even if the aesthetic attitude idea has been expressed
awkwardly in the past, there is surely nothing wrong with the notion
that someone who appreciates junkyards aesthetically looks at them
in a different way or attends to different features than someone
who's interest is, for example, purely financial. When a junkyard
owner appreciates his property for the money it brings in, this is not
aesthetic appreciation. Country Vermonters often appreciate their
junk piles as collections of possibly useful materials: junk cars, for
example, as sources of spare parts. This too would not be aesthetic
appreciation.
Part of Carlson's argument against roadside clutter is that it is not
natural, that roadsides that appear in "nature" (i.e. the relatively
pristine nature that conservationists, environmentalists, and many
poets love) should not have such unnatural things as junk and
clutter alongside. Yet, if his argument is that the non-natural in
natural environments should be excluded from appreciation, then it
should be extended to Frank Lloyd Wright's Fallingwater. Perhaps
Carlson does not so extend it because he finds Wright's work
attractive. If so, then the issue really has nothing to do with what is
natural: it is entirely a matter of taste. Carlson is aware that the
argument based on what is natural is weak. As he observes, "artists
and craftsmen make objects more aesthetically pleasing simply by
making them less natural," for example, when a cabinet maker
polishes his or her wood. Also, defining "natural" in such a way as to
exclude what humans do is problematic given that humans are
products of nature.
Carlson therefore turns to a stronger argument based on the
distinction between thin and thick senses of "aesthetically pleasing."
The thin sense refers to physical appearance, whereas the thick
sense goes beyond the physical to refer to "qualities and values
which the object expresses and conveys to the viewer."[15] To
illustrate the distinction, he quotes John Hospers: "When we
contemplate a starry night or a mountain lake we see it not merely
as an arrangement of pleasing colors, shapes, and volumes, but as
expressive of many things in life, drenched with the fused
association of many scenes and emotions from memory and
experience." Yet exactly the same thing can be said about a
junkyard, i.e. that it is expressive of many things in life, has many
associations, etc. Indeed, when Beardsley introduced the second
horn of the dilemma he did so by describing the aesthetic experience
of an automobile graveyard as one in which the objects are taken as
symbolic and expressive.
At first it seems that Carlson simply assumes that appreciation of a
junkyard must be thin rather than thick, that it must be somehow
purely a matter of attending to physical qualities, which Hospers, at
least, seems to understand in terms of the qualities that formalists
like in art. Yet, it is not clear that we ever see things aesthetically
purely as physical and without other cultural associations. If so, the
very distinction between thick and thin is problematic. At best one
could speak of appreciation being relatively thin or thick.
Carlson thinks that a junkyard could not be perceived aesthetically
thickly for then it would have to be perceived as expressive in a
special and unacceptable way: "[T]he quality must be associated
with the object in such a way that it is felt or perceived to be a
quality of the object itself." I take this to mean that there cannot be
any consciously imaginative seeing involved in this perception. Just
as earlier I argued that there are no examples of pure thin
appreciation, I argue here that there are no examples of purely
unimaginative perception. Humans are naturally imaginative: they
not only see, but "see as," and they often do so at the same time. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between what is seen in
the object perceived because it is felt actually to be there, and what
is imaginatively projected onto the object. The distinction only works
at the extreme, as in imaginatively projecting a camel shape onto a
cloud, where the expressive quality of the cloud in this case has
nothing to do with the cloud's actual nature. The word for
imaginative projection in science is "hypothesis" which, as we know,
is necessary for scientific knowledge. Seeing something as or under
a scientific concept can involve an imaginative projection that goes
contrary to conventional ways of seeing or understanding. Similarly,
seeing expressive qualities in an object may well go contrary to what
one feels is clearly a quality within the object itself. Imaginatively
seeing something is seeing it in terms of its potentiality or in terms
of its possibility, and these are the features of a thing that give it,
phenomenologically speaking, life.
Carlson asks what life values are expressed through aesthetic
appreciation of clutter and junk. I have no problem with this My
problem arises when he argues that the values expressed by a
junkyard must be "waste, disregard, carelessness, and exploitation."
I suggest, rather, that the values affirmed in aesthetic appreciation
of a junkyard are, or at least could be, those of non-conformity;
recognition that messiness can sometimes be valuable; a belief that
the margins of our world have their own unique interest; and
perhaps nostalgia for things of another era that have achieved a
certain patina through rust and decay. An important value affirmed
is that old discarded things can come alive again visually if looked at
or treated in the right way. In this way, the aesthetics of junk may
be closely related to the aesthetics of antiques. In short, Carlson’s
thick perception of junkyards is just one of many.
3. Do Life-Values Affect Aesthetic Appreciation?
The negative values Carlson mentions may seem to be the values
expressed in junkyards to someone who does not appreciate
junkyards aesthetically, or to someone who appreciates junkyards
for formalist reasons but who feels bad about it ethically. The
problem, perhaps, goes back to Sontag, who saw Camp as
emphasizing texture and style as opposed to content. Sontag seems
to have taken an overly formalist approach to appreciation of junk.
Her neglect of content left a vacuum, and Carlson rushed in with his
idea that the content is waste and disregard. Carlson admits that a
junkyard could also express the value of hard work, but insists that
this would not erase the other values expressed. Note that junkyard
owners themselves would hardly see themselves as expressing the
values Carlson attributes to them.
Still, even if the life-values of some of the people who produce
roadside clutter are waste and disregard, these are not necessarily
the life-values of those who appreciate it aesthetically. Moreover,
the life-values of some who produce what others consider roadside
clutter are not at all of this sort: I am thinking of people who live in
the desert and who prefer to surround themselves with worn-out
cars, appliances, and other junk, but arranged in an interesting way.
Further, what something is expressive of, when that thing is not
consciously produced as an expression (and a junkyard is seldom
consciously produced as an expression of anything), is hardly a
matter of fact. Carlson, himself, admits at the end of his essay that
he cannot be certain what life values these objects express, [16]
which seems inconsistent with his earlier claim that they must
express values of waste, etc..
Another way to approach junk that is both thick and positive can be
found in a blog by Andy Green: "A real study and use of Junk will
recognize that bottles and burnt cars are testimonies to anonymous
men; that rusted washing machines are monuments to domestic
and economic struggles; that all derelict objects are imbued with
particular resonance in particular locations that can bring new
(sometimes troubled) meanings to life." [17] Green goes on: "
These Junk-sites mark the intersections of our personal histories,
underlying interests, conscious and unconscious desires. They may
look dirty or offensive to some, but junk is really a slide show of our
deep humanity, as well as our flaws." Green further writes: "It is
possible that junk can allow us to confront the more dangerous
'wild' aspects of our social environments, as well [as] offering a
more constructive way of approaching our connection to each other
across a divided social landscape."
Green's approach to junk is socially engaged. Although aesthetic, it
is not aestheticist or Camp. Perhaps moving beyond Rauschenberg,
Green denies interest in "dumping a rusty washing machine on the
floor of the Tate and calling it a clever critique of consumer based
societies." As he puts it, " Those kinds of statements soon become
far too general, lose their force of argument, their specific context,
and lapse into aesthetic cliché all too easily: an 'aesthetics' of junk
that has lost a meaningful relationship to a living landscape."
Carlson thinks it is empirically uncontroversial that we cannot
appreciate a junkyard in the thick sense. But the claim would only
be uncontroversial if the expressed qualities must be the ones that
Carlson describes. We could appreciate junk in a thick sense if we
took it to have the expressive properties I or Green have
mentioned.
Carlson further believes that appreciation of the effect means
condoning the cause. Thus, on his view, if I appreciate a junkyard I
must be condoning values of waste and exploitation. And yet this is
not the case in our appreciation of Versailles. As Kant once
observed, in appreciating Versailles we are not condoning all the
values that went into its making, for example absolute
monarchism.[18] One could say that from a moral perspective the
palace of Versailles is expressive of waste and exploitation.
(Rousseau certainly thought so.) But I think we can still experience
it as beautiful. Moreover, even if we do not accept Kant's notion of
disinterested perception we can see that a thick appreciation does
not require taking on all of the moral baggage of origins.
It has been suggested by an anonymous reader of an earlier version
of this paper that our ability to appreciate Versailles is a function of
historical distance and that we could not as easily appreciate a more
recent palace built on a foundation of injustice. This may be true to
some extent, but note that Kant himself was not significantly
temporally distant from the creation of whatever palaces or
representations of palaces he may have seen. There is nothing to
keep us from aesthetically appreciating recent products with
questionable ethical histories, nor is it clear that forbidding
appreciation of morally questionable buildings produces any ethical
good that can counterbalance the aesthetic loss.
At the end of his essay Carlson turns to the issue of artist
appropriation of junkyard materials. He first makes the dubious
suggestion that Duchamp was expressing the negative values of
waste, etc., when he displayed Fountain. He then suggests, more
plausibly, that when an artist is successful in using junk in his or her
art, as Picasso was in his Bull's Head, the result is only made
possible when the junk is recycled in such a way that the expressive
properties of the junkyard are erased. This may work for some uses
of junk in art. But consider Robert Venturi, Steve Izenour, and
Denise Scott Brown's influential idea that we can learn from Las
Vegas. In 1964 Peter Blake wrote a book called God's Own
Junkyard: The Planned Deterioration of America's Landscape, in
which he spoke of neon signs as roadside clutter.[19] In 1977
Venturi, Izenour, and Brown transformed our understanding of neon
signs and "the strip" through their postmodernist redefinition of
architecture inspired by the time they spent in Las Vegas.
4. The Ethics of Aesthetic Appreciation
In response to Carlson, Yuriko Saito takes a somewhat different
approach to roadside litter, junkyards and clutter.[20] She holds
that Carlson's argument against roadside clutter is not aesthetic but
ethical. She writes that "As an aesthetic argument, the reference to
the ethically undesirable expressive qualities of littering, power lines,
and strip-mining does not make a good justification against
them."[21] For example, the aesthetic qualities of the natural
environment and the expressive qualities of the strip mine might
both be reinforced by their mutual contrast.
At this point in her article Saito takes a different tack, arguing that
although contrast is important in a painting or a play, with respect
to environments, we normally appreciate unity and consider contrast
to be a demerit. We appreciate both natural and man-made
environments in terms of their overall ambience or character, which
can be spoiled if mixed. She admits that this argument would fail to
show that a unified environment such as a Las Vegas-like city would
aesthetically fail as a replacement of natural scenery, but suggests
that the ambiance of Las Vegas is one of vulgar, loud commercialism
that is not really enjoyable. This seems the wrong approach as,
although it is not enjoyable to her and to me, it is clearly enjoyable
to the thousands who choose to visit. Her solution is to affirm
Carlson's argument against roadside clutter not as aesthetic but as
ethical, but with aesthetic implications. Abusive treatment of the
natural environment would always, on this view, destroy its
aesthetic value.
However, Saito's argument could be equally directed against Las
Vegas itself and towards my favorite junkyard simply because she
does not find them enjoyable or thinks they are examples of abusive
treatment. And this same argument could equally be directed
against Fallingwater or any humanly constructed environment since
they all involved replacing natural scenes with human ones, and
there is always someone who doesn't enjoy them.
In contrast to Carlson and Saito, and in line with the position I have
presented here, Paul Ziff argues that "anything that can be viewed is
a fit object of aesthetic attention."[22] The only limits are one's
power to create the appropriate frame or context for what one sees.
Ziff describes what he oddly calls an antiaesthetic approach to litter.
As he puts it, "The antiaesthetic approach is to alter one's view to
see the original litter not as litter but as an object for aesthetic
attention…One can look upon the disorder of litter as a form of order
a beautiful randomness a precise display of imprecision."[23] By
'antiaesthetic' he seems to mean not non-aesthetic but "contrary to
traditional aesthetics." He then suggests that looking at the work of
abstract expressionist painters Jackson Pollock and Mark Tobey
might help one to appreciate litter. Perhaps Monet and Braque would
be helpful too, as he says: "Garbage strewn about is apt to be as
delicately variegated in hue and value as the subtlest Monet.
Discarded beer cans create striking cubist patterns."[24]
There are, of course, distinctions between junkyards, roadside
clutter, garbage dumps, and oil spills.[25] Junkyards, for example,
are often intended to contain items for re-use. It might be argued
that, because of this, Carlson was wrong in his thick description of
junkyards. It might further be argued that he would have been right
if he had given a similar thick description of roadside litter, garbage
dumps, or oil spills. I admit that some things are more difficult to
appreciate aesthetically than junkyards; a major oil spill would be an
excellent example. Nor should we be in any way required to try to
appreciate such things. At the same time, nothing says that they
cannot be appreciated. There have been artworks that have focused
on the aesthetic properties of similar phenomena: Robert Smithson's
Asphalt Rundown (1969) would be one example. My main point is
that there is no one right thick description of a junkyard, roadside
clutter, a garbage dump, or even an oil spill.
5. Conclusion
It might be argued that my approach relies on artworks and not on
immediate experience of the environments described. My view of
this is that artists are particularly sensitive observers of our world
and that they capture aesthetic features in their works that we might
not normally notice. For example, a photographer may typically
think, "wow, that looks interesting" before photographing a
junkyard. (I take "interesting" here to be an aesthetic property. )
Photographer Robert Adams, recently featured in the television
series, Art 21, photographs clear-cut forests. Although he
disapproves of the aesthetic devastation caused by clear-cutting, he
still finds beauty in certain aspects of what he photographs.
Some would argue that aesthetic appreciation of junkyards or any
other sites that would entail harming the environment would be no
different from aesthetically appreciating representations of the
horrors of Auschwitz, and that both are blameworthy. But as Ziff
helpfully observes, there are some things that disgust us so much
that we cannot aesthetically appreciate them, although it may be
that others can. I do not deny that there could be a case for moral
censure for aesthetic appreciation of representations of the horrors
of the holocaust that focused on qualities of, for example, grace and
charm. Still, there is no problem with aesthetically appreciating
something that one also considers to be horrifying or inhuman. If
there were, then the Greek tragedies would have been impossible.
Finding something tragic is a kind of aesthetic appreciation. Consider
also that we can appreciate a forest that has been devastated by
fire or mud-slide. There is something sublime in such instances of
natural destruction. Appreciation of the results of human
devastation, for example an oil spill, may not be so different.
Nor do I think that it is required that we be aesthetically disgusted
by whatever disgusts us ethically.[26] I suspect that those who
would require this believe, like Plato, that aesthetic appreciation of
representations of evil will lead to carrying out acts of evil, but it
has never been clear that this is the case. I have heard that sunsets
are more beautiful in smoggy conditions. However, we should not be
required to stop appreciating their beauty because of that. After all,
aesthetic appreciation of something does not require a commitment
to its continued existence. I would be willing to sacrifice some
measure of beauty in sunsets so that fewer people would suffer from
debilitating lung disease. I would not be willing to sacrifice my
appreciation of the beauty of current smog-related sunsets simply
because someone thinks it immoral for me to do so, as my
appreciation is not hurting anyone. Of course, once I learn that the
sunset has been enhanced by smog conditions, my appreciation of it
might change…I might see it as a sad beauty, and so too with my
junkyard if I found it was a major source of pollution. What may be
taken as a sign of uncaring on the part of the person who created
the pollution or the roadside trash is not thereby required to be
seen, in a thick way, as an expression of uncaringness.
It might finally be argued that the roadside is a commons and that
different aesthetic standards are applicable to a commons than to
private home or public art gallery. The average citizen, so the
argument goes, should not have to put up with whatever the avant-
garde aesthete might happen to appreciate. For example, people
have been known to discard plastic bottles filled with urine onto the
roadside in Oregon.[27] Most people find this disgusting, and
although a photograph of such a thing may be pleasing to a
contemporary art-lover, depending on how the photograph is taken,
this would be no reason to condone the continued presence of such
bottles. The idea of different aesthetic standards for the commons
hearkens back to the debate over Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc, in
which it was sometimes argued that the public should not be made
the victim of avant-garde aesthetic standards that they do not
share. The argument had some merit, and in the end it did not
seem unreasonable that the work was removed because it was
displeasing for many who lived and worked in the area. Of course
the plastic bottle of urine that I have seen in a photograph was
presumably not placed on the roadside as an aesthetic statement,
avant-garde or otherwise, and no artist claims responsibility for it.
So the case may seem more open and shut than the Richard Serra
case.
I will concede that different aesthetic standards might be
appropriate for the commons; something like "majority rules" may
be more appropriate than the rule of the Humean good judge in the
commons, at least some of the time. This is tricky since we do not
want to say that the public can never be educated. The majority
opposed Maya Lin’s Vietnam War Memorial at first but eventually
came to embrace it. On the other hand, it doesn’t make much sense
to talk of educating people into appreciating plastic bottles filled with
urine. Rules like "no trash on the roadside, especially no plastic
bottles filled with urine" are perfectly acceptable, even to those who
might find such things sometimes aesthetically interesting. Nor is it
unreasonable for people to find these objects displeasing. After all,
we have deeply ingrained attitudes against aesthetic display of
human waste, attitudes that although they might be challenged in an
art gallery, probably should not be challenged publicly. On that
other hand, I do not think anyone is morally required to find a
photograph of a plastic bottle of urine disgusting, or required not to
find it aesthetically pleasing. This is true even though most of us
would find it disgusting that someone should impose their urine on
us in this way. It is also true that even though a photograph might
evoke that disgust, it is still possible for such a photograph to be
good and even beautiful. The same goes for the actual scene
photographed, i.e. that it makes a photographically interesting
scene. In fact, I think the photograph I have seen is in fact a good
and interesting photograph largely because of its expressive as well
as its formal properties. It might then be asked what does it mean
for me to say the photograph is good. Unlike Kant, I do not demand
or even expect that everyone find it good. What the phrase means is
simply that I would be surprised if people with similar training in the
contemporary visual arts would not be able to see the photograph,
or the scene photographed, as I do.
Where the commons end and the private realm begins is another
matter, and it is often hotly contested. City ordinances often make
demands about how one ought to decorate one’s front yard. For
instance, there is a rule in my city against parking a car on the lawn.
On the other hand, some people in my neighborhood value the
aesthetic appearance of their cars and would prefer to display them
in this half private/half public place. I tend to support more freedom
for self-expression in such cases. I also tend to value graffiti art (but
not mere graffiti tagging) over many manifestations of conventional
but boring "good taste" that dominate our urban and suburban
landscapes.
In conclusion, Carlson's distinction between thick and thin concepts
fails to resolve Beardsley's dilemma of aesthetic education. It would
only do so if there was only one possible, quite negative, thick
description of aesthetic experience of junkyards, and I have shown
this to be implausible. Beardsley himself believes the dilemma is
irresolvable, and I basically agree. The best we can do is attempt to
balance the competing interests of those who wish to beautify road
scenes through eliminating what they consider to be unsightly, and
those who value quite different aesthetic effects. The debate, in the
end, is really quite similar to that between architectural
conservatives in San Francisco who wish to limit building design to
pre-modernist styles and those who believe the city can find a place
for modernist architecture. I have not sought to defend all junkyards
and roadside clutter, but simply to clear a space for a form of
aesthetic appreciation that is freer, more imaginative, and more in
tune with important discoveries of modernist art than is allowed by
current morality-centered views in aesthetics.
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